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FIU Bridge Collapse Due to Negligence, OSHA Claims

According to a new Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) report, negligence from almost every party involved led to last year’s collapse of a pedestrian bridge at Miami’s Florida International University, killing 6 and permanently disabling one other. The pedestrian bridge project was supposed to pose lower risk of disruption thanks to a construction method called “accelerated bridge construction,” intended to minimize the time and risk involved on-site by performing much of the work off-site and then relocating it. Yet, according to the report, almost all parties involved shared some fault for the collapse, most notably FIGG Engineering-Bridge Group, the firm that designed the bridge.

On March 15, 2018, the bridge collapsed onto the street below, where multiple cars were waiting at a stoplight. FIGG Engineering-Bridge Group had designed the bridge and engineering firms Louis Berger and Bolton Perez and Associates provided additional design checks. Miami-based construction firm Munilla Construction Management (MCM) managed the bridge’s construction off-site and relocated it to the school using the accelerated bridge construction method.

OSHA says that FIGG produced a “deficient” design and the company’s attempts to seal cracks in the bridge led to its collapse.

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FIGG reportedly also ignored MCM workers’ concerns about the bridge’s growing cracks, saying that it had examined them and did not find anything troubling. Given this response from FIGG, OSHA wrote that MCM should have exercised “independent judgment with regard to implementing necessary safety measures” to address those growing cracks and close the street below. OSHA also said that the road should have been closed immediately as FIGG attempted to repair the crackswork that, as the Miami Herald reported, put additional stress on already-faulty and weak internal support cables.

According to the OSHA report, at a meeting with all construction participants on the day of the collapse, FIGG’s lead engineer “acknowledged that his computations could not replicate the cracks and, therefore, he did not know why the cracks were occurring.” Upon being told that the cracks were widening daily, he “stated more than once that the cracks did not present any safety concerns.
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” The engineer had also reportedly called the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) three days before the collapse to claim the same.

The report also calls into question Louis Berger’s independent review of the bridge’s designs, noting that the firm’s “constrained” budget and time led to deficiencies in the firm’s analysis, including not examining the post-installation construction phase, during which the collapse happened. OSHA said FIGG violated FDOT requirements by not requiring Louis Berger to conduct the full examination and failing to provide the firm with necessary documents.

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Bolton Perez and Associates was reportedly aware of the cracks in the bridge, but failed to follow DOT requirements to “exercise its own independent professional judgment,” and did not recommend that the street be closed.

After the incident, victims filed 18 lawsuits against 25 companies connected with the collapse, with depositions beginning in May 2019. According to the Miami Herald, MCM declared bankruptcy and in May, the judge overseeing its bankruptcy approved a $42 million insurance settlement for victims and their families. Additionally, FIU has designated that its $5 million insurance payment should go to the victims. FIGG released a statement this week calling the OSHA report “factually inaccurate and incomplete,” citing “flawed analysis.” A National Transportation Safety Board report is forthcoming, but may not be released until 2020.

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FIU Bridge Collapse Brings Up Design, Safety Concerns

Munilla Construction Management rendering of the completed FIU pedestrian bridge.

The 950-ton section of a pedestrian bridge’s collapse at Florida International University (FIU) that claimed six lives on March 15 has put stakeholders, design and installation firms under intense scrutiny. After months of preparation, the 174-foot span had been installed on March 10, and investigators and authorities are trying to establish if negligence played a part in the tragedy on SW 8th Street on FIU’s Modesto A. Maidique Campus.

The bridge was constructed off-site and relocated using Accelerated Bridge Construction (ABC), a popular (and usually successful) industry method that aims to reduce potential risks to workers, commuters and pedestrians and minimize traffic interruptions. According to FIU, the bridge should have been a record-setter; on March 10, the University claimed it was “the largest pedestrian bridge moved via Self-Propelled Modular Transportation in U.S. history.” It was also poised to be the first in the world to be constructed entirely of self-cleaning concrete, which would have ultimately reduced maintenance costs.

Munilla Construction Management (MCM) was the Miami-based construction firm hired by FIU to manage and construct the FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity Bridge, which jointly worked with design firm FIGG Engineering-Bridge Group. Barnhart Crane and Rigging operated the Self-Propelled Modular Transporters that placed the bridge on its permanent supports, and engineering firm BDI was subcontracted to conduct monitoring while the bridge was moved into place.

It was expected that the footbridge would be completed and operational in early 2019 and would also have served as a study and gathering space for students. The $14.2 million project was funded by Florida Department of Transportation, FIU and the City of Sweetwater, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) TIGER Grant, but the blame shifting has already begun. The Miami Herald reported:

…the project required “an independent, secondary design check,” and the design team, FIGG Bridge Engineers, hired another engineering firm, Louis Berger. That firm “was not FDOT pre-qualified for this service, which is required under FIU’s agreement with the state. FIU’s design build team is responsible for selecting a pre-qualified firm and ensuring this process is followed.”

The main span of the FIU-Sweetwater UniversityCity Bridge was installed in a few hours with limited disruption to traffic over the preceding weekend. FIU stated that on the morning of the collapse that MCM and FIGG met to discuss a crack on the on the structure, but ultimately concluded that “there were no safety concerns and the crack did not compromise the structural integrity of the bridge. This meeting lasted approximately two hours and included FIU and FDOT representatives.”

FIU added an FAQ page to its website in the aftermath of the collapse. It clarifies that FIU did not yet own the bridge “because it was still under construction” and names the key stakeholders, but does not yet reveal what was happening at the time of the collapse “because it still does not yet have the information.” The DOT stated that Secretary Elaine L. Chao dispatched Federal Highway Administration professional staff to the site to support the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) investigation.

An insightful article published by Wired explains the ABC process and looks at other incidents, noting that in this case the collapse could stem from design flaws and possibly loose cables burdened by the weight of the bridge.