Для тех, кто интересуется безопасным доступом к онлайн-играм, наш партнер предлагает зеркало Вавады, которое позволяет обходить любые блокировки и сохранять доступ ко всем функциям казино.

P&C Rates Drop 1% in March

The composite rate for property and casualty insurance dropped 1% in March compared to March 2014, indicating a softening market, according to MarketScout.

“March is an important month. There is a considerable volume of U.S. business placed with both the U.S. and international insurers,” noted Richard Kerr, CEO of MarketScout. “While a small change from February, the downward adjustment in rates may be an indicator of what is to come for the next six months.”

By coverage classification, general liability and umbrella/excess liability dropped from up 1% in February to flat or 0% in March. Commercial auto, professional liability, and employment practices liability (EPLI) were also down 1% in February as compared to March. No coverages reflected a rate decrease.

By account size, small accounts (up to $25,000 premium) adjusted downward from up 2% to up 1%. Large accounts ($250,000 to $1,000,000 premium) were flat as compared to up 1% in February. The rates for all other accounts were unchanged.

Industry classifications all remained the same as in February, except for contracting and transportation, which were up 1%t in March, compared to up 2% in February. Habitational was flat or up 0% in March, compared to up 1% in February.

Summary of the March 2015 rates by coverage, industry class and account size:

By Coverage Class
Commercial Property Up 1%
Business Interruption Up 0%
BOP Up 1%
Inland Marine Up 0%
General Liability Up 0%
Umbrella/Excess Up 0%
Commercial Auto Up 1%
Workers’ Compensation Up 0%
Professional Liability Up 1%
D&O Liability Up 1%
EPLI Up 1%
Fiduciary Up 0%
Crime Up 0%
Surety Up 0%

 

P&C Rates in U.S. Rise 1% in February

The composite rate in the U.S. in 2015 for all property and casualty lines was up 1% in February, compared to flat in January 2015, MarketScout said today.

Pricing measurements by coverage showed no further price deterioration in any line and an increase of 1% in auto, professional liability and EPLI, from plus 1% to plus 2%. By account size, large accounts ($250,001 to $1,000,000 premium) increased from flat to plus 1%, while all other account sizes remained the same as in January, according to MarketScout.

“Could this mean underwriting executives are actually walking away from underpriced business?” asked Richard Kerr, MarketScout CEO.

“February is normally a low volume premium month so we would caution about putting too much credibility in these metrics; however, historically once the insurance market starts softening it normally accelerates rather than moderates or turns around,” he said in a statement. “We speculate insurers are not going to cut deep and long in this cycle. Big data, modeling software and improved underwriting acumen are resulting in insurers simply being too smart to fall for extended and deep price cuts.”

When measuring by industry classification, contracting, habitational, public entity and transportation all increased by 1% in February compared to January.

Summary of the February 2015 rates by coverage, industry class and account size:

By Coverage

Commercial Property         Up 1%

Business Interruption       Up 0%

BOP                                  Up 1%

Inland Marine                   Up 0%

General Liability                Up 1%

Umbrella/Excess               Up 1%

Commercial Auto              Up 2%

Workers Compensation     Up 0%

Professional Liability          Up 2%

D&O Liability                    Up 1%
EPLI                                Up 2%

Fiduciary                          Up 0%

Crime                               Up 0%

Surety                              Up 0%

 

 

 

 

 

Sixth Circuit Affirms EEOC Credit-Check Case Dismissal

Less than three weeks after oral argument, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court order granting summary judgment in favor of Kaplan in one of the EEOC’s most high profile cases – EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp.

The EEOC brought suit against Kaplan for using credit-checks in its hiring process – “the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses” the Sixth Circuit pointed out – claiming that the practice had a disparate impact on African Americans.

On Jan. 28, 2013, Judge Patricia A. Gaughan of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of Kaplan, finding that the EEOC’s statistical evidence of disparate impact was not reliable and not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. (Read more about that ruling here.)

The Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. The EEOC’s “homemade” methodology for determining race – by asking its “race raters” to label photographs – was, in the Sixth Circuit’s words, “crafted by a witness with no particular expertise to craft it, administered by persons with no particular expertise to administer it, tested by no one, and accepted only by the witness himself.”

Background

The EEOC filed suit against Kaplan alleging that Kaplan’s use of credit-checks causes it to screen out more African-American applicants than white applicants, creating a disparate impact in violation of Title VII.

In support of its allegations, the EEOC relied on statistical data compiled by Kevin Murphy.  Because Kaplan’s credit check process was race-blind, the EEOC subpoenaed records regarding Kaplan’s applicants from state departments of motor vehicles. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia provided color copies of approximately 900 drivers’ license photos.

Murphy assembled a team of five “race raters” and directed them to review the photos and classify them as “African-American,” “Asian,” “Hispanic,” “White,” or “Other.” Murphy also provided the raters with applicant names.

Based on the results of this “race rating,” Murphy opined that, in a sample of 1,090 (out of 4,670 applicants), the percentage of black applicants who were flagged for review based upon their credit histories was higher than the percentage of white applicants who were flagged.

The district court excluded Murphy’s testimony as unreliable for two reasons. First, the EEOC presented “no evidence” that Murphy’s methodology satisfied any of the factors that courts typically consider in determining reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702; and second, as Murphy himself admitted, his sample was not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kaplan, and the EEOC appealed.

The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit noted that, as the proponent of expert testimony, the EEOC bears the burden of proving its admissibility. It determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the EEOC failed to make such a showing.

The EEOC argued that the district court erred in finding that it had “wholly fail[ed]” to provide evidence that its technique had been tested or had any “known or potential rate of error.” The EEOC contended that it provided such support in the form of “anecdotal corroboration.” That is, as to 57 applicants, Murphy cross-checked his raters’ classifications with racial identifications provided by a DMV or Kaplan.

The Sixth Circuit noted that the EEOC’s cross-check yielded an 80% match – “an unimpressive correlation in case where a few percentage points (in credit-check fail rates for blacks and whites) might make the difference between significant liability and none.” In any event, as Murphy himself conceded, a mere 57 instances of anecdotal corroboration is “not enough” to establish the reliability of his photo rating methodology.

As the Sixth Circuit found, “[t]he EEOC’s case goes downhill from there.” The EEOC failed to present evidence that its technique was subjected to peer-review or publication, failed to show that Murphy employed standards to control “the technique’s operation,” and presented no evidence that Murphy’s race-rating methodology was “generally accepted in the scientific community.” The raters themselves “had no particular standard in classifying each applicant; instead, they just eyeballed the DMV photos.”

Finally, as an independent ground for excluding Murphy’s testimony, the district court found “no indication” that Murphy’s group of 1,090 applicants was representative of the applicant pool as a whole. The Sixth Circuit noted that, “[i]nstead there is a strong indication to the contrary: Murphy’s group had a fail rate of 23.8%, whereas the GIS applicant pool had a fail rate of only 13.3%.” It held that an unrepresentative sample “by definition” might skew the respective fail rates of black and white applicants in the larger pool – “and thus is not a reliable means to demonstrate disparate impact.”

Implications

In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit staunchly critiqued the EEOC’s “do as I say, not as I do” litigation tactics. It noted (in the first line of its opinion) that the EEOC “sued the defendants for using the same type of background check that the EEOC itself uses.” It also noted, as the district court observed, that “the EEOC itself discourages employers from visually identifying an individual by race and indicates that visual identification is appropriate ‘only if an employee refuses to self-identify.’”

This blog was previously published by Seyfarth Shaw LLP.

Alabama Court Dismisses EEOC Dreadlocks Policy Challenge

Employing reasoning adopted by a number of other courts, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama recently dismissed the EEOC’s claim that an employer’s policy prohibiting employees from wearing dreadlocks violated Title VII – the case of EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions. In its ruling, the Court confirmed that “employers’ grooming policies are outside the purview of Title VII,” and it further rejected the EEOC’s argument that the definition of race under Title VII should be read expansively to encompass more than immutable physical characteristics unique to a particular group.

Case Background

The case arose after Chastity Jones, an African-American applicant received an offer of employment from the defendant. At the time of the job offer, the employer had a grooming policy, which provided in part that “hairstyles should reflect a business/professional image” and prohibited “excessive hairstyles or unusual colors.” The employer interpreted the policy as prohibiting the wearing of dreadlocks, and thus conditioned its offer on Jones cutting off her dreadlocks. When Jones declined to do so, defendant withdrew the offer of employment. The EEOC filed suit, alleging that application of the policy to prohibit dreadlocks violated Title VII and that defendant intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. The employer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

EEOC’s Arguments

The EEOC argued that the employer had refused to hire Jones because she was black and that a policy that prohibits dreadlocks is racially discriminatory on its face because dreadlocks were determinant of racial identity. The EEOC also urged the Court to adopt an expansive definition of race under Title VII that would encompass “both physical and cultural characteristics, even when those cultural characteristics are not unique to a particular group.”

As an apparent fallback position, the EEOC argued that dismissal was inappropriate because it should be allowed to present expert testimony on three factual predicates:  1) “that Blacks are primary wearers of dreadlocks”; 2) that dreadlocks are “a reasonable and natural method of managing the physiological construct of Black hair”; and 3) that dreadlocks have a “socio-cultural racial significance” for blacks.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court rejected the EEOC’s arguments and dismissed the EEOC’s complaint. First, the Court identified a number of decisions addressing policies that restricted hairstyles and finding that such policies were non-discriminatory. Agreeing with these decisions, the Court held that a “hairstyle, even one more closely associated with a particular ethnic group, is a mutable characteristic.”  The Court also rejected the EEOC’s arguments regarding “socio-cultural racial significance,” noting that culture and race are different concepts and that “Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on traits, even a trait that has socio-cultural racial significance.”

Implications for Employers

This decision further reinforces an employer’s right to establish and enforce grooming policies and describes some parameters on the application of those policies. In addition, when facing EEOC charges which attempt to expand race discrimination under Title VII beyond immutable characteristics, the decision provides support for a defense that mutable characteristics, including traits that have purported “socio-cultural racial significance,” may not be protected as a matter of law.

This blog was previously published by Seyfarth Shaw LLP.