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JPMorgan Chase Reportedly Ignored Its Risk Management Department’s Warnings About Madoff

Exhibit #8,492,299 why companies should start listening to their risk managers.

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Senior executives at JPMorgan Chase expressed serious doubts about the legitimacy of Bernard L.

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Madoff’s investment business more than 18 months before his Ponzi scheme collapsed but continued to do business with him, according to internal bank documents made public in a lawsuit on Thursday.

On June 15, 2007, an evidently high-level risk management officer for Chase’s investment bank sent a lunchtime e-mail to colleagues to report that another bank executive “just told me that there is a well-known cloud over the head of Madoff and that his returns are speculated to be part of a Ponzi scheme.”

Then again, it’s not altogether surprising that a financial firm would bury its head in the sand as long as money was still coming in and the risk ultimately did not fall on its shoulders. I feel like we’ve seen that somewhere else on Wall Street in the past few years.

Despite those suspicions and many more, the bank allowed Mr. Madoff to move billions of dollars of investors’ cash in and out of his Chase bank accounts right until the day of his arrest in December 2008 — although by then, the bank had withdrawn all but $35 million of the $276 million it had invested in Madoff-linked hedge funds, according to the litigation.

The Madoff saga continues to unfold.

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The Financial Crisis Was a Failure of Risk Management, Says the Federal Government

We already knew this, but the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission has confirmed the fact that the financial meltdown that spurred the largest economic downturn since the Great Depression was avoidable and only occurred because no one involved understood the risks they were taking.

Regulators, politicians and bankers were to blame for the 2008 US financial meltdown, a report has claimed.

The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, tasked with establishing the causes of the crisis, said it was “avoidable”.

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Its report highlighted excessive risk-taking by banks and neglect by financial regulators.

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Only the six Democrat members of the 10-strong commission, set up in May 2009, endorsed the report’s findings.

“The crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or models gone haywire,” the report said.

“The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand and manage evolving risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public.

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“Theirs was a big miss, not a stumble.”

The best part will be when nobody learns anything from this and it all happens again in like five years.

Improving the Treasurer’s Critical Risk Management Role

Over the years, the role of the treasurer has evolved from a mainly operational function to something more strategic that involves board-level accountability and the responsibility to help manage enterprise-wide risks. At its most basic, the treasurer must safeguard the assets of a company and manage liquidity to support the operations of the company’s principal business. This task is complicated by the minute-to-minute fluctuations in the financial markets and was never more challenging than during the recent financial crisis. In an online exclusive article for Risk Management, Andrew Woods of SunGard suggests that these circumstances demonstrate the need for treasurers to utilize the latest technology and risk management best practices in order to get a better picture of their organization’s risk profile.

Effective use of technology is the only way a treasurer who manages global exposures can consolidate and analyze information quickly and accurately. Automating the exposure management process eliminates errors, creating opportunities for optimal cost savings and risk reduction. By interacting with enterprise resource planning (ERP) and accounting systems and other exposure data sources, treasurers and risk managers are able to accurately identify, quantify and manage exposures based on complete data, with minimal dependence on IT or finance.

To read the full article, be sure to visit RMmagazine.com.

Q&A: The Impact of Basel III

Banks have feared the impending Basel III reforms for some time now. We have covered the topic in the past, both on the Monitor (the most recent Basel III-related post here) and in Risk Management (our April 2010 issue).

Starting tomorrow, regulators will come together for a two-day meeting of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The purpose of the meeting is to come to an agreement on liquidity and the quality of capital to fill gaps in an overhaul of rules known as Basel III. Earlier this month, the G-20 endorsed the Basel reforms.

To get a bit of insight on the matter and how the reforms will affect insurers, I contacted Adam Girling, principal at the Financial Services Office of Ernst & Young, with a few questions on the topic.

How will the largest global investment banks deal with the impact of Basel reforms?

Adam Girling: One of the most significant impacts of the new Basel reforms is the substantial increase in capital requirements for trading book exposures, which are those positions held on a short-term basis with the intent to trade. The Basel Committee Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) and industry estimates suggest that risk-weighted assets for many trading portfolios will rise under the new requirements by three to four times on average, and potentially more for some portfolios. Particularly hard hit are securitization exposures. The global banking organizations with sizeable trading portfolios are looking at where their capital requirements are increasing most and whether they need to bring capital requirements down by hedging or unwinding positions — although liquidity of positions remains an issue. Coupled with the analysis of changing capital requirements are new Basel III leverage and liquidity coverage standards, as well as industry reforms around over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and proprietary trading. So institutions are reviewing their business strategies and considering which businesses to exit stay the course or grow given the combined impact of changing market dynamics and new regulatory constraints.

Do you think economic growth will be hampered by Basel III bank capital standards?

AG: This is a profound question and there is certainly a divergence of views. For example, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) analysis suggests a potentially large impact, while the Basel Committee itself projects a quite limited impact. Theoretically, the extended implementation period should provide an opportunity to identify potential unintended consequences and an opportunity to make adjustments as, and if, necessary. The biggest risks are likely in the transition phase. The Basel committee has calculated that with the long transition periods retained earnings can boost capital ratios sufficiently, but the industry may set expectations for banks to meet the new standards sooner. If this is the case, banks will either need to raise extra capital or will need to reduce the risk in their balance sheets — potentially via changing their lending profiles to maintain an acceptable rate of return on equity.

How will the Basel reforms affect insurers?

AG: Basel II applies to banking organizations and Basel III does not propose to change those subject to the risk-based capital standards.  In the US, Basel II has, to date, only applied to the largest and most internationally active banking companies on a consolidated basis. And to my knowledge, none of these institutions have a top-tier parent that is an insurance company. If any insurance companies were deemed systemically significant under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, it is quite possible that the enhanced capital and liquidity requirements to which they would be subject would incorporate Basel III. In Europe, however, Solvency II is enhancing risk-based capital for insurers using a three pillar framework similar to Basel II.