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Cyber Risk a Top Concern for C-Suites

NEW YORK—Risk managers no longer have a problem getting the attention of their company board and executives when it comes to cyber issues, according to panelists at the Advisen Cyber Risk Insights conference yesterday.

At Royal Ahold N.V., in fact, a supervisory board “insists on an annual presentation on the insurance policies,” which include cyber, said Nicholas Parillo, vice president of global insurance for the company. Giving his annual presentation to the board is made much easier, because “the person before me is the chief security officer and before that, the CIO and it’s good to know that they are saying the same things I’m saying. That’s the level this kind of risk has achieved within major corporations.

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In the U.S., Ahold owns about 2,000 supermarkets—780 in the northeast, including Stop ‘n Shop and Giant Food Markets and 300 pharmacies, Parillo said. The company, which has annual revenue of $42 billion, also owns a number of chains throughout Europe.

Parillo noted that Ahold’s chief concern is the large amount of customer data needed for its goal of major online sales growth.

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“Our CEO a couple of years ago established a goal of increasing our online sales from $400 million annually to $1.5 billion,” he said. “We should hit that target in the next two years or sooner. One of our big concerns in this area is fast growth in ecommerce,” and also that “good governance surrounds” that growth.

The company purchased its first cyber security insurance policy in 2007, he said, an action that was hastened by “two watershed events in retail business,” the Hannaford Bros. Co. privacy violation and the TJ Maxx case. Both of these have run into the “hundreds of millions of dollars now with a significant amount of legal fees associated,” he said, adding, “These events made my job a lot easier in terms of going to my management and saying that this could happen to us, despite the biggest and the brightest in our IT group.”

Jimmy Kirtland, vice president, corporate risk management with ING said that in the past, “trying to convince your CFO and CEO and general counsel that there really was [cyber] exposure,” was an issue. He explained that 10 or 15 years ago, “Even if you were going to look at cyber coverage you had only three brokers you could go to.”

Since then, “There has been a complete turnaround in 10 years. The market has grown tremendously and so have the brokers and it’s become much more sophisticated, which we appreciate. The C-suite has recognized that this is something that has to be looked at,” he said.

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Dutch-based ING is restructuring, separating its banking and insurance operations. ING U.S. plans to rebrand as Voya Financial, a retirement, investment and insurance company, according to the company’s website. “In our case, one of the biggest concerns we had was that because of the split with our parent company, we had very little time to place our financial lines products, including cyber. So the concern is to get it right.”

The company filed an IPO in May, “and yesterday we announced we would have a secondary offering. When you don’t have the umbrella of a major global corporation anymore, you become keen on your risks and exposures,” Kirtland said.

What happens if technology fails at the company? “With us it really is out in the cloud,” Kirtland said. “Classic business insurance reimburses you for supply chain problems or if a warehouse burns down, so it’s an extra expense we have to worry about.”

To be able to stay in business in case of a technology failure, or in the case of “a system-wide blowout, we went with a time-limited type of retention. It’s a set amount based on the time you are out,” he explained.

Are Banks Reassessing Risky Practices in Wake of Libor Scandal?

Yesterday in London, executives of the Royal Bank of Scotland testified in front of a Parliament commission of banking standards. The topic at hand was of course the much-publicized Libor rate-rigging scandal that cost RBS more than $600 million in fines from the UK’s Financial Services Authority, the U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, and the U.S. Department of Justice.

In the hearing, CEO Stephen Hester was quick to note that the scandal was the product of unscrupulous behavior by the firm’s employees. “The behavior was the disgraceful failure of individuals,” testified Hester. But he also didn’t hide from the fact that his company failed to detect the rate rigging. “We were slow to recognize that behavior and catch it,” he said at the hearing.

The FSA’s director of enforcement and financial crime, Tracey McDermott, put it a little more strongly. “During the course of the FSA’s work on Libor, RBS provided the FSA with an attestation that its LIBOR related systems and controls were adequate,” said McDermott in statement. “This was not correct. The FSA takes it very seriously when firms tell us they have appropriate systems but do not.”

McDermott went on to point out the effect that all this has on whole investment banking sector. “The extent and nature of the misconduct relating to Libor has cast a shadow on the reputation of this industry, and we expect firms to take steps to ensure that this can never happen again. This is the third penalty we have imposed in relation to Libor-related misconduct. The size and scale of our continuing investigations remains significant.”

John Hourican, who headed RBS’s investment banking division before resigning last week, said that the taxpayer-bailed-out bank was on “cardiac arrest” given all the troubles that began in 2008, so it had to “prioritize dealing with the existential threat to the bank.” That is what may have led to the breakdown in controls that subsequently led to the rate rigging going on under management’s nose.

The company was simply too busy dealing with other, more-pressing threats to pay any attention to what a rate-rigging possibility that some in the bank considered an impossibility.

According to a Wall Street Journal report, former investment banking head John Cameron believes this left the company exposed to a type of behavior not unexpected of traders.

RBS’s former head of investment banking, Johnny Cameron, who left the bank in early 2009, said traders at banks involved in the attempted rate manipulation had more in common with each other than other bank workers, and that their behavior seemingly had little to do with the firms they worked for.

It is “as much about the culture of traders and people who trade things than any bank,” Mr. Cameron said in his testimony to the committee.

He said RBS’s risk managers failed to recognize the potential for traders to influence submissions used to help set interest-rate benchmarks, and that the failure highlighted why traders need “tight and close management.”

“I do think that traders have a particular approach to life and need much tighter controls. By and large, those controls are imposed. What happened in this case was that the risk managers didn’t recognize this as a risk, and those controls were not there,” Mr. Cameron said.

In short: traders are going to be traders and somebody needs to be watching them — but, in this case, nobody was.

Perhaps that vulgar reality about the banking world is what is motivating two other financial sector giants to move away from some of their riskier trading activities, according to the New York Times blog Dealbook.

First, it has this to say about Barclay’s recent decision to lay off 3,700 employees.

Barclays announced a major restructuring that will eliminate 3,700 jobs and close several business units, as the bank reported a big loss in the fourth quarter of 2012.

The overhaul of its operations comes after a series of scandals at the bank, including the manipulation of benchmark interest rates, which led to the resignation of the firm’s former chief executive, Robert E. Diamond Jr.

In a bid to reduce its exposure to risky trading activity, Barclays plans to close a number of operations in Europe and Asia, including a tax-planning unit that has been criticized for tarnishing the firm’s reputation.

“There will be no going back to the old way of doing things,” the chief executive, Antony P. Jenkins, told reporters at a news conference in London on Tuesday. “We will never be in a position again of rewarding people for activities inconsistent with our values.”

Then, Dealbook notes the following regarding UBS’ decision to part ways with the former head of its investment banking.

Carsten Kengeter, the former head of UBS‘ investment bank, has been on the outs at the Swiss banking giant for some time. On Tuesday, the bank announced that he was resigning.

Mr. Kengeter has been head of the bank’s non-core division, which oversees the assets that the bank is hoping to unload as it tries to exit higher risk banking activities.

But when he was running the investment bank, Kweku M. Adoboli, a trader in the London office, was accused of authorized trading that led to a $2.3 billion loss for the bank. Mr. Adoboli  was eventually found guilty of fraud and sentenced to seven years in prison.

The trading loss raised serious questions about the firm’s oversight and led to the resignation of  Oswald J. Grübel, the chief executive of UBS. Also during Mr. Kengeter’s time at the investment bank, UBS became ensnared in an investigation into the manipulation of the global interest rate benchmark Libor, or the London interbank offered rate.

There may be no direct thread running through these announcements.

It could all be a coincidence.

But as regulators continue to scrutinize those who fail to detect the risky, illicit behavior of those working within their firms, it seems as though some banks are starting to embrace the risks of their core business over those that are more difficult to oversee.

JP Morgan’s Poor Risk Management

JP Morgan’s $6.2 billion “London Whale” trading loss was a much-publicized event in 2012. In the aftermath, some called for the resignation of CEO Jamie Dimon, while others pointed their finger at lax risk management standards within the bank. Yesterday, we finally found out what JP Morgan’s opinion on the matter is in a lengthy report. Their conclusion: inadequate risk management financial oversight within the chief investment office (CIO) and JP Morgan as a whole.

To be more specific, on page 97 the report states, “CIO Risk Management lacked the personnel and structure necessary to properly risk-manage the Synthetic Credit Portfolio, and as a result, it failed to serve as a meaningful check on the activities of the CIO management and traders.

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This occurred through failures of risk managers (and others) both within and outside of CIO.”

The head of the CIO, Peter Weiland, resigned quietly in October while others involved either left the bank or their positions were rearranged over the past several months. But Jamie Diamond escaped partly unscathed (he did have to testify before Congress and recently had his pay cut to a tiny $11.5 million from $23 million). Interestingly enough, so did JP Morgan’s chief risk officer and the CIO chief risk officer, which is confusing considering the statement on page 97.

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Two top CFOs were held responsible for the costly blunder, however.

As CFO reported yesterday:

The report, released Wednesday, said JPMorgan’s former top CFO, Douglas Braunstein, “bears responsibility” for weaknesses in financial controls related to the investment portfolio and could have asked more questions about changes in its value and its increasing exposure to adverse movements in the financial markets.

The other former finance chief criticized in the report was John Wilmot, who headed the CIO’s finance function.

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Wilmot and his team failed to set up robust reporting controls, the report said, “including sufficient circulation of daily trading activity reports, [which] made early detection of problems less likely.”

While the task force noted that the “primary control failures were risk management failures,” the finance organizations headed by Braunstein and Wilmot “could have done more.” In the case of the CIO’s finance team, the task force stated that in part it took “too narrow [a] view of [its] responsibilities,” believing the issues related to the CIO’s credit portfolio “were for the risk organization and not finance to flag or address.”

So while the JP Morgan task force noted that there were errors made on both the risk management side and the finance side, the bank ultimately held the finance department responsible. Braunstein stepped down while Wilmot resigned and will be leaving the bank this year.

The roles of CRO and CFO are often intertwined and overlapping. Do highly risky decisions involving potentially large losses or gains require the oversight of the finance or risk management department, or both? It likely remains a case-by-case basis and this JP Morgan fumble will likely remain the industry’s glaring example of what not to do.

The Insurance Industry Needs More Dynamic Models

Simpler, but more dynamic capital models are what the insurance industry needs in order to avoid suffering some of the same problems it did during the financial crisis that began in 2008, according to the Willis Economic Capital Forum (WECF), a Georgia-State-University-based initiative from the academic and analysis arm of Willis Group.

Markus Stricker, director of the WECF, said in a statement that “everyone in the industry would be interested in reducing the complexity of models, making things more transparent and thus easier to understand. We ought to have learnt in the years since the financial crisis that our economic capital models need to be more dynamic and more insightful.”

He went on, explaining that looking at economic capital models in a static manner is not very helpful. Instead, he suggests insurers develop models that are simpler, yet still useful and easier to use. Stricker suggests learning from other industries that have such models in place.

For example, airplane manufacturers run stress tests to find out how much pressure they can put on a wing before it breaks off, while pharmaceutical companies have a rigorous, structured process they must go through to get a medication validated.

“I think we need a similar set of standard procedures to validate the methods that financial companies use to calculate solvency related key figures,” said Stricker. Currently, standardized processes do not exist for validating economic capital models.

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It seems insurance companies, regulators and brokers could all benefit from a validation process that is transparent and efficient.